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Outside the psychologist’s laboratory, thinking proceeds on the basis of a great deal of interaction with 
artefacts that are recruited to augment problem solving skills. The role of interactivity in problem solving was 
investigated using a river crossing problem. In Experiment 1A, participants completed the same problem twice, 
once in a low interactivity condition, and one in a high interactivity condition (with order counterbalanced across 
participants). Learning, as gauged in terms of latency to completion, was much more pronounced when the high 
interactivity condition was experienced second. When participants first completed the task in the high 
interactivity condition, the transfer to the low interactivity condition during the second attempt was limited; 
Experiment 1B replicated this pattern of results. Participants thus showed greater facility to transfer their 
experience of completing the problem from a low to a high interactivity condition. Experiment 2 was designed to 
determine the amount of learning in a low and high interactivity condition; in this experiment participants 
completed the problem twice, but level of interactivity was manipulated between subjects. Learning was evident 
in both the low and high interactivity groups, but latency per move was significantly faster in the high 
interactivity group and this on both presentations. So-called problem isomorphs instantiated in different task 
ecologies draw upon different skills and abilities; a distributed cognition perspective may provide a 






 are encountered frequently through 
everyday activity, varying in complexity and 
occurring across a diverse array of settings. In solving 
these problems, or indeed making sense of situations, 
people interact with local resources, both cultural and 
material (Kirsh, 2009). Traditionally, problem solving 
has been cast and understood in terms of information 
processing models of move selection in a clearly 
defined problem space (Newell & Simon, 1972) or 
more recently of the shifts in excitatory and inhibitory 
activation in layered networks of “knowledge 
elements” that result in the restructuring of a problem 
representation in working memory (Ohlsson, 2011, p. 
105). An emphasis on mechanisms of information 
processing do not foreground the co-determination of 
an agent’s representation of the problem and a 
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problem’s physical presentation wrought by 
interactivity (Kirsh, 2009; 2013).  
Transformation problems have been the focus of 
research in cognitive psychology for the past 50 
years. In these problems, a well-defined space 
connects an initial and a goal state. Legal moves are 
defined in terms of simple rules and enacted with 
simple operators. Participants must reach the goal 
state by transforming the initial state through a series 
of intermediate states. A well-studied class of 
transformation problems are river crossing problems. 
In these problems, objects—people, animals, or 
things—must be carried from one “riverbank” to 
another on a “boat” but with a set of constraints on 
moves that can be selected to reach the goal. A 
common version involves three missionaries and 
three cannibals (Reed, Enrst, & Banerji, 1974; or 
three hobbits and three orcs, Thomas, 1974). In 
transporting all cannibals and missionaries from one 
bank to the other, cannibals must not outnumber 
missionaries on either bank. The boat can take at 
most two passengers, and at least one. The problem 
space is relatively narrow since illegal moves cannot 
produce blind alleys of any depth (Reed et al., 1974) 
and can be completed in 11 steps. In different 
versions, problem difficulty is a function of the rules 
that constrain the number of objects that can be 
moved at any one time, which combinations of 
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objects are allowed on the boat, and which 
combinations can be left on either bank. The number 
of objects and the rules that govern their transport 
map out a problem space that links the initial state 
with all objects on one side of the river to a goal state 
with all objects on the other riverbank. Cognitive 
psychologists have used this task as a window onto 
problem solving, particularly planning, search and 
move selection (Reed et al., 1974; Simon & Reed, 
1976). As such river crossing problems have been 
used as a testing platform for a number of process 
models of search and move selection, strongly 
influenced by developments in AI (Simon & Reed, 
1976).  
Greeno (1974) suggests that individuals learn 
from repeated attempts at completing the river 
crossing task, reflected primarily through a sounder 
appreciation of which move is correct in each state. 
Reed et al. (1974) also investigated the effects of 
experiencing this type of problem twice in a series of 
three experiments, examining transfer and learning 
using analogous problems (e.g., the river crossing 
problem and the jealous husbands problem). They 
found that learning occurred with repetition of the 
same problem, however, transfer of knowledge 
between analogous problems was limited. Knowles 
and Delaney (2005) reported that with certain 
incentives, illegal moves could be reduced with 
repeated attempts.  
Interactive Problem Solving 
The river crossing task involves moving people or 
things across a surface and as such foregrounds the 
importance of interacting with a physical model of 
the task. However, interactivity in the river crossing 
problem solving has never been an explicit and 
systematic focus of investigation. The manner with 
which the river crossing task has been implemented 
varies a great deal across studies. For example, Reed 
et al. (1974) used different types of coins to represent 
missionaries and cannibals. Jeffries, Polson, Razran 
and Atwood (1977) developed a basic computer 
interface where participants typed in the objects they 
wanted to put in the boat on a given crossing. The 
interface accepted only legal moves and updated the 
simple representations (often with letters and 
numbers, such as ‘3M’ for three missionaries) on 
either side of the riverbank. Participants kept on 
typing in their moves until they managed to transport 
all objects from one bank to the other. Knowles and 
Delaney (2005) designed a more realistic interface 
with icons representing travellers against a backdrop 
of a river with two banks and a boat. Participants 
selected moves by clicking on the travellers, which 
then appeared next to the boat on the screen. In all 
these instances participants were never offered a 
three-dimensional work surface on which objects 
transparently corresponding to the scenario 
protagonists are manipulated and moved by hand. In 
contrast, developmental psychologists who worked 
with the river crossing task, being less sanguine about 
‘formal operations’ presumably, have taken care to 
design rich interactive thinking environments with 
physical materials representing the boat, the river, and 
figurines corresponding to the cover story characters 
(e.g., Gholson, Dattel, Morgan, & Eymard, 1989).  
A more explicit experimental focus on 
interactivity may unveil important aspects of problem 
solving performance, aspects that may correspond 
more closely to problem solving performance as 
observed outside the laboratory. For example, there is 
evidence that in other transformation problems 
interactivity substantially transformed problem 
solving behaviour. Vallée-Tourangeau, Euden and 
Hearn (2011) reported that mental set is significantly 
reduced in Luchins’s volume measurement problems 
when participants interact with an actual physical 
presentation of the problem. The manipulation of 
water jars created a dynamic problem presentation 
revealing solutions that were not simulated mentally. 
The selection of moves was guided and governed by 
the pragmatics of manipulating real objects in a wet 
environment to achieve a goal, and participants were 
less likely to persevere using a more complicated 
solution for the test problems. In a river crossing task, 
interactivity may help participants work out the 
quality of different moves not by simulating their 
consequences mentally, but rather by simply 
completing the move and observing the results. Such 
moves then are ‘epistemic actions’ (Kirsh & Maglio, 
1994): moves that may not, in themselves, necessarily 
help narrow the gap with the goal state, but rather 
provide information as to what to do next. Kirsh and 
Maglio  demonstrated that it is faster and easier to 
physically rotate the tetrominoes in Tetris than to 
simulate their rotation mentally, leading to better and 
more efficient problem solving behaviour. Move 
selection in the river crossing task can be 
opportunistic, although not necessarily mindless; 
rather the strategic consequences of a certain move 
can simply be observed. In a high interactivity 
context, planning need not take place “in the head”—
moves may not be premeditated; rather the trajectory 
through the problem space is enacted through the 
moves (cf. Vallée-Tourangeau & Vallée-Tourangeau, 
LEARNING AND INTERACTIVITY     3 
2014).  
Thus, in a high interactivity environment, there 
may be less pressure on reasoners to simulate 
mentally a path to a goal state and move selection 
may not be dictated by a plan (cf. Suchman, 1987). 
Problem solving performance could well be 
influenced by the ease with which reasoners can enact 
moves. In a context that favours interactivity, 
participants may produce more moves in solving the 
river crossing problem, but do so more quickly than 
in a context in which implementing a move is slower 
and more costly in terms of mental planning effort.  
Some have argued that as a result, high 
interactivity may retard the acquisition of a more 
abstract representation of the task and hence may not 
lead to the same degree of learning (O’Hara & Payne, 
1998; Svendsen, 1991). With a river crossing 
problem, a low level of interactivity may force 
participants to think longer before selecting a move 
and may encourage the development of a sounder 
appreciation of the logical structure of the task, which 
then helps participants transfer their knowledge to a 
different presentation of the same or similar 
problems. These participants, once presented with the 
problem a second time, but in a high interactivity 
condition, may proceed to solve the problem much 
faster. In turn, solving a river crossing problem first 
in a high interactivity condition may promote a more 
procedural appreciation of the task that might be 
bound to the exact physical characteristics of the 
reasoning context and hence transfer poorly when 
participants complete the problem a second time, but 
in a low interactivity condition. The goal of the 
present experiments was twofold: To determine the 
impact of interactivity on performance in the river 
crossing problem and to determine the amount of 
learning across two presentations of the problem as a 
function of interactivity.  
Experiment 1A 
Experiment 1A examined performance in the river 
crossing problem when presented with or without 
artefacts as an aid to solution. This was measured in 
terms of number of moves, latency to completion and 
latency per move. In a high interactivity condition, 
the problem was presented with a board, a raft and six 
figurines: Participants had to move the raft and the 
figurines across the board to register a move until 
they had moved all six figurines from one bank to the 
other. In a low interactivity version, the problem was 
described on a piece of paper and participants were 
asked to verbalise the moves they would make to 
reach the goal. They completed the problem twice, 
once with the high interactivity version and once with 
the low interactivity version; the order was 
counterbalanced across participants. Experiment 1A 
employed a mixed design with interactivity level as 
the repeated measures factor and order—low 
interactivity first, high interactivity first—as the 
between subjects factor. As moves can act as 
epistemic actions, we predicted that participants 
would produce more moves, would solve the problem 
more quickly and that hence latency per move would 
be shorter in the high compared to the low 
interactivity condition. We also predicted that 
participants would complete the second presentation 
of the task more quickly than the first since they 
would be familiar with the procedure and may well 
exploit an episodic record of their trajectory to help 
them select better moves, and select them more 
quickly. However, the nature of the experience during 
the first crossing as a function of interactivity level 
could influence the amount of learning. On the basis 
of the arguments formulated in O’Hara and Payne 
(1998; see also Svedsen, 1991), low interactivity 
forces participants to plan and contemplate moves 
and their consequences; the additional time and effort 
encourage more deliberation, and as a result 
participants are more likely to develop a sounder 
understanding of the problem and select fewer but 
better moves. When the problem is experienced a 
second time, this time in a high interactivity 
condition, performance improvements should be 
steep. In turn, experiencing the problem in a high 
interactivity condition first, may reduce the 
investment in deliberative efforts, perhaps mitigating 
the development of a more abstract, hence 
transferable, representation of the problem: There 
should be little evidence of learning when the 
problem is experienced a second time in a low 
interactivity condition. In light of the results obtained, 
and at the recommendation of reviewers of a previous 
version of this manuscript, we replicated this initial 
experiment: We refer to the two versions as 1A (the 
original) and 1B (the replication).  
Sample Size. Reed et al. (1974) studied the effect 
of transfer between two problems with similar 
problem states, the Missionaries and Cannibals and 
the Jealous Husbands problems. The experimental 
design for their Experiment 2—the first experiment 
was inconclusive and the third addressing issues too 
dissimilar from the ones explored here—was a two 
factor mixed design, with problem type and order as 
the factors. They recruited a sample of 54 
participants, with 50 successful solvers, 25 in each 
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problem condition. For Experiment 1A we recruited 63 
participants, after removing participants who did not 
complete the task and outliers, we conducted our 
analysis on a sample of 48. Experiment 1B is a 
replication of Experiment 1A, following an a priori 
power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) to estimate the sample size 
required to obtain a similar effect. The observed p
2 
= 
.149 for the 2 x 2 interaction effect on latency per move 
in Experiment 1A corresponded to a large effect size (f 
= .42, see Cohen, 1992), with a correlation between 
repeated measures of .016. Based on these estimates, 
the a priori power analysis indicated that a total sample 
size of 40 would be sufficient to detect a similar effect 
size. Given the sample depletion due to participants not 
completing one or both attempts, as well as the 
possibility of having to remove long latencies to control 
for skewness, we recruited a similar number of 







Figure 1. Record sheet for the river crossing moves in 
the low interactivity condition (left panel); board, raft 




Experiment 1A. Sixty-three university 
undergraduates participated in the experiment in return 
for course credits. The data for three participants were 
incomplete, therefore unsuitable for analysis. Of the 
remaining sixty participants, nine did not complete the 
river crossing problem and were excluded from further 
analyses. Following tests for skewness for the 
completion latencies, a further 3 participants were 
removed from the analysis. The final sample was 
composed of 48 participants (41 females, Mage = 21.3, 
SD = 5.0). 
Experiment 1B. Sixty-five university 
undergraduate and postgraduate students participated in 
the experiment in return for course credits. Twelve 
participants did not complete the task and were 
excluded from further analysis; the final sample 
comprised of 53 participants (43 Females, Mage = 21.5, 
SD = 3.93). 
Materials and Procedure 
Chickens and wolves were the protagonists in a river 
crossing scenario. The objective was for the six animals 
to be transported from the left riverbank to the right one. 
The selection of a move had to comply with the 
constraints and rules of the problem. The same 
instruction sheet explaining the objective of the task and 
the rules of the problem was used for both conditions 
and could be read by the participants throughout the 
duration of the task. The instructions read: 
 
“Three wolves and three chickens on the left 
bank of a river seek to cross the river to the right 
bank. They have a boat that can carry only two 
animals at a time, but there must always be an 
animal on the boat for it to move. However if at 
any time the wolves outnumber the chickens on 
either bank the wolves will eat the chickens. 
Thus you cannot move the animal(s) in a manner 
that will result in the wolves outnumbering the 
chickens on either bank. The goal of the task is 
to move all the animals from the left bank to the 
right bank.” 
 
In the low interactivity version of the task, the 
researcher transcribed each move as verbalised by the 
participant onto a record sheet. The record sheet was a 
simple representation of the raft between the left and 
right banks of the river, with slots to record the nature 
and number of the animals on either side (which was 
denoted with a ‘C’ for chickens and ‘W’ for wolves; see 
left panel of Fig. 1); each page represented only one 
move. At any one time, participants could only inspect 
their previous move as they dictated their next move to 
the experimenter. As soon as the next move was dictated, 
the sheet with the previous move was turned over. Thus 
participants could not inspect a historical record of 
previous moves. Illegal moves proposed by the 
participant were noted, but the experimenter did not 
transcribe the nature of the illegal move on the recording 
sheet. Rather, participants were invited to re-read the 
task instructions to discover why such a move was not 
allowed.  
Legal moves were the moves made by the participant 
from the first move to the final move that met the 
constraints or rules as set out in the instructions sheet 
available to all participants throughout each attempt, 
whereas Illegal moves were denoted as any moves that 
did not meet these constraints. The decision to include 
 
	
Fi ure 1. Record sheet for the riv r crossing moves in the low interactivity condition (left 
panel); board, raft and figurines in the high interactivity condition (right panel). 
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all violations of the rules as illegal moves was made in 
order to measure the total number of moves completed 
by the participant during the entirety of the attempt. 
Knowles and Delaney (2005) did not include violations 
of the rules which negated the movement of the boat if 
either empty or carrying more than two passengers on 
the grounds that participants may make errors in using 
the computer interface or through lack of understanding 
of the rules. In the experiments presented here there was 
no computer interface to negotiate. In addition, the rules 
and instructions were available in a printed format for all 
participants throughout both attempts; in fact, 
participants were actively encouraged to refer to the 
rules throughout the task.  
The high interactivity version of the task involved the 
use of six plastic figurines, three wolves (9cm x 7cm x 
2cm) and three chickens (4cm x 5cm x 1.5cm), one pop-
stick raft (9cm x 6cm) and a painted board (60cm x 
45cm) representing the river and banks (see right panel 
of Fig. 1). As the participants interacted with the 
artefacts, the experimenter recorded the moves, but this 
record was never shown to the participants; as with the 
low interactivity condition this ensured that participants 
could not review the problem solving trajectory. An 
illegal move prompted the experimenter to instruct 
participants to move the raft and the animals back to the 
previous state and, as in the low interactivity condition, 
they were invited to re-read the instruction sheet to 
determine which moves were possible. In both 
conditions participants were given up to 15 minutes to 
complete the river crossing problem. Participants were 
not asked to prioritize the number of moves made or the 
time in making moves, nor were they explicitly told how 
long they would be given to complete the task. If the 
participant questioned the amount of time allowed to 
solve the problem, the researcher explained that a 
reasonable amount of time would be allowed within the 
confines of the experimental session time. However, any 
participant unable to finish one or both attempt within 15 
minutes was excluded from subsequent analyses. 
A 20-minute interval was designed between the two 
presentations of the river crossing problem during which 
participants completed a number of non-verbal puzzles, 
including finding similarities and differences between 
series of pictures, and identifying the odd picture in a 
series of thematically related pictures. Finally, the river 
crossing task was presented again in the alternate 
condition (either low or high interactivity) to that which 
was presented first; the order was counterbalanced across 
participants. Thus, the independent variables 
manipulated were condition (low interactivity, high 
interactivity) and order (low interactivity first, high 
interactivity first) in a 22 mixed design. Performance in 
both conditions was measured in terms of latency to 
solution, the total number of moves to solution, and 
latency per move. The latter offers the more interesting 
window onto problem solving performance across 
interactivity conditions since it provides a gauge of how 
quickly, on average, participants generate each move. In 
keeping with previous river crossing studies legal and 
illegal moves are reported separately. The latency per 




Experiment 1A. Indices of skewness—as calculated 
following the guidance in Fidell and Tabachnick (2003, 
p. 118)—indicated that the latencies in three of the four 
experimental conditions were within the range of 
normality, but not in the low interactivity condition when 
experienced first. As mentioned above, removing three 
outliers in this condition resolved this problem (Z = 1.2). 
Latencies to solution, reported in Table 1, suggest that 
participants completed the second presentation of the 
task faster when they experienced the low interactivity 
condition first, followed by the high interactivity 
condition. A 22 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
revealed that the main effect of interactivity was not 
significant, F(1, 46) = .606, p = .440,p
2 
= .013, while 
the main effect of order was significant F(1, 46) = 8.17, 
p =.006, p
2 
= .151; the interactivity condition by order 
interaction was not significant F(1, 46) = 2.70, p = .107, 
p
2 
= .055.  
Experiment 1B. Indices of skewness indicate that 
the latencies in the four experimental conditions were 
normally distributed. Latencies to solution are shown in 
Table 1; the pattern of findings closely replicated what 
was observed in Experiment 1A. The faster change in 
crossing latency was observed in the high interactivity 
condition when participants first completed the task in 
the low interactivity condition. A 2x2 mixed ANOVA 
showed the main effect of interactivity was not 
significant, F(1, 51) = 3.45, p = .069, p
2
 = .063, while 
the main effect of order was significant, F(1, 51) = 5.12, 
p = .028, p
2
 = .091; the interactivity condition by order 
interaction was also significant, F(1, 51) = 9.76, p = 
.003, p
2
 = .161. Post hoc tests indicated that latencies in 
LEARNING AND INTERACTIVITY      6 
Table 1 
Mean Latencies and Mean Number of Moves to Completion (along with their SD) in the River Crossing Problem for 
Each of the Three Experiments. Order Indicates the Order of Interactivity Undertaken in the Experimental Session ( 
L = Low Interactivity and H = High Interactivity). First and Second Represents the First or Second Attempt in the 
Experimental Session. 
the low interactivity condition did not decrease 
significantly from the first to the second presentation, 
t(51) = 0.358, p = .419. In turn participants were faster in 
the second attempt at the problem than the first in the 
high interactivity condition, t(51) = - 4.097, p < .001. 
When participants completed the low interactivity 
condition followed by the high interactivity condition, 
they were significantly faster in the second attempt, t(23) 
= 4.297, p < .001. When participants completed the high 
interactivity condition first then the low interactivity 
condition there was no significant decrease in the time 
taken to complete the problem, t(28) = .820, p = .419. 
Moves 
Experiment 1A. The high interactivity condition 
elicited a greater number of legal moves in solving the 
river crossing problem compared to the low interactivity 
condition in both orders (see Table 1). In turn, the mean 
number of illegal moves was greater in the high 
interactivity condition than the low interactivity 
condition when it was experienced first, but the 
frequency of illegal moves was relatively stable in the 
second presentation for both conditions. Thus, 
combining legal and illegal moves the total number of 
moves was always higher in the high interactivity 
condition. In a 2x2 mixed ANOVA for total moves the 
main effect of interactivity was significant, F(1, 46) = 
13.95, p =.001, p
2 
= .233, while the main effect of order 
and the interactivity by order interaction were not, Fs < 
1.  
Experiment 1B. The high interactivity condition 
once again elicited a greater mean number of legal 
moves compared to the low interactivity condition in the 
first attempt (see Table 1). However, unlike Experiment 
1A the number of legal moves in the second attempt 
were similar for both conditions. In turn, the mean 
number of illegal moves was higher in the high 
interactivity condition than the low interactivity 
condition when it was experienced first, but in the 
second attempt the number of illegal moves was lower in 
the high interactivity than the low interactivity condition. 
Overall, then, total moves were greatest in the high 
interactivity condition for the first attempt but in a 2x2 
mixed ANOVA the main effects of interactivity, F(1, 51) 
= 1.27, p = .265, p
2
 = .024, and order, F(1, 51) = 2.70, p 
= .107, p
2
 = .050, were not significant, nor was the 
interaction, F(1, 51) = 2.34, p = .132, p
2
 = .044.  
Latency per Move 
Experiment 1A. The latency per move data—latency 
to completion divided by the sum of legal and illegal 
moves—are shown in the left panel in Figure 2. Latency 
per move in the low interactivity condition was 
unaffected by order, however participants appeared 
faster at enacting moves in the high interactivity 
condition, especially the second time the participants 
engaged with the task. In a 22 mixed ANOVA the main 
effects of interactivity, F(1, 46) = 15.7, p < .001, p
2 
= 
.255, and order, F(1, 46) = 8.90, p = .005, p
2 
= .162, 
were significant, as was the interactivity condition by 
order interaction, F(1, 46) = 8.05, p =.007, p
2 
= .149. 
Post hoc tests indicated that the low interactivity latency 
per move was not significantly affected by order, t(46) = 
-.105, p = .916, whereas completing the high 
interactivity condition in the second attempt led to 
significantly faster move selection than in the first 
attempt in the high interactivity condition, t(46) = -4.94, 
p < .001. Further, participants were faster in making 
 
Experiment Order M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
1A L/H 337.30 106.61 255.39 168.06 12.70 2.44 17.00 7.75 2.83 2.27 3.52 4.64 15.52 3.36 20.52 10.06
H/L 426.24 189.48 397.00 234.63 15.84 4.96 13.88 4.25 5.72 4.42 3.64 3.41 21.56 8.45 17.52 6.81
1B L/H 463.92 236.71 246.04 139.77 17.46 7.27 17.17 8.18 3.04 4.41 2.50 4.19 20.50 10.42 19.67 10.51
H/L 493.97 267.51 438.62 271.15 19.07 7.22 16.97 7.66 7.55 4.61 4.14 6.87 26.62 10.14 21.10 13.29
2 L/L 408.12 165.04 217.21 78.35 13.45 3.80 12.06 1.87 3.39 2.76 1.15 1.66 16.85 5.65 13.21 2.47
H/H 399.16 186.25 233.59 96.25 16.41 5.81 15.41 4.99 4.73 2.85 2.86 2.54 21.14 7.58 18.19 6.35
Legal Illegal Total
First Second First Second First Second First Second
Latency (s)
Moves
First shows the results for a Participant Completing the Low Interactivity Condition First and L/H Second the High Interactivity Second. 
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Figure 2. Mean latency per move in the two interactivity conditions (low, high) for the first and second attempt for 
each of the three experiments. For the left and middle panels, Experiments 1A and 1B, the group that experienced the 
high interactivity condition first is represented by a broken line and the group that experienced the low interactivity 
condition first is represented by a solid line. Error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
 
moves in the high interactivity condition following 
experience in the low interactivity condition, t(24) = 
8.32, p < .001. Finally, there was no significant 
difference in how quickly moves were made in the low 
interactivity condition when experienced after the high 
interactivity condition, t(22) = 0.641, p = .528. 
Experiment 1B. The latency per total move data in 
the replication experiment are shown in the middle panel 
of Figure 2. The pattern from Experiment 1A was 
replicated: Latency per move in the low interactivity 
condition appeared to be largely unaffected by order, 
however participants were faster at enacting moves in 
the high interactivity condition, and this was particularly 
evident on the second attempt. In a 2x2 mixed ANOVA 
the main effect of interactivity was significant, F(1, 51) 
= 39.17, p = .001, p
2
 = .434, but the main effect of order 
was not, F(1, 51) = 1.42, p = .238, p
2
 = .027; however, 
the condition by order interaction was significant, F(1, 
51) = 10.2, p = .002, p
2
 = .167. Post hoc tests indicated 
that the difference in latency per move was not 
significantly different between the two low interactivity 
attempts, t(51) = .646, p = .521, but the time taken to 
select a move during the second attempt in the high 
interactivity condition was significantly faster than 
during the first attempt, t(51) = - 3.42, p = .001. In 
addition, participants were faster in making moves in the 
high interactivity condition following experience in the 
low interactivity condition, t(23) = 8.36, p = .001; 
latency per move remained unchanged when the high 
interactivity preceded the low interactivity condition, 
t(28) = 1.97, p = .059. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1A and 1B investigated the impact of 
interactivity on problem solving performance for a river 
crossing problem. In both experiments participants were 
required to solve the problem twice, once in a low 
interactivity context in which moves were simulated 
mentally and dictated to an experimenter and once in a 
high interactivity context where moves could be enacted 
through a three-dimensional display that corresponded to 
the main features and protagonists of the problem. The 
experiment was conducted twice to determine the 
robustness of the findings. In both the original 
experiment (1A) and its replication (1B) a high level of 
interactivity generally encouraged participants to make 
more moves in reaching a solution than when they 
completed the low interactivity condition. The latency 
per move data indicated that participants were always 
quicker to select a move in the high interactivity 
condition, and were generally quicker to select a move 
during the second presentation of the problem.  
However, the more important pattern in these data was 
the interactivity condition by order interaction observed 
in Experiment 1A and replicated in Experiment 1B: 
Latency per move dropped precipitously when the 
second presentation of the problem occurred in the high 
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latency per move data motivated by the significant order 
by condition interaction, revealed an identical pattern of 
results in both Experiments 1A and 1B. Thus, in both 
experiments, order did not affect latency per move in the 
low interactivity condition, but did so in the high 
interactivity condition. In addition, there was no 
difference in latency per move between the low and high 
interactivity conditions if the high interactivity condition 
was attempted first, but latency per move was 
substantially reduced when the high interactivity 
condition was attempted second.  
The replication of the latency per move data is 
particularly informative. However, it is important to 
consider all the data patterns including those not 
replicated. While the replication produced similar 
outcomes for six of the nine main results, to better 
evaluate the outcomes of the replication we take the 
three incongruous results in turn. First, the overall 
latency data showed a significant interactivity condition 
by order interaction in Experiment 1B but not in 
Experiment 1A. This may be explained by the fact that in 
1A the mean latency recorded in the low interactivity 
condition when it was presented first was much lower 
than in 1B. However, the general trend was the same for 
both experiments with latency decreasing as would be 
expected from the first to the second attempt in both 
orders of presentation. Second, in the total moves data, 
the interactivity main effect was significant in 1A but not 
1B. This seems to reflect the greater number of moves 
during the first attempt in the low interactivity condition 
of Experiment 1B. As Table 1 shows, however, the 
difference in the mean total moves, between the first 
attempt in the low interactivity condition and the first 
attempt in the high interactivity condition was similar at 
6 moves for both experiments. Third, the latency per 
move data revealed a significant main effect for order in 
1A but not in 1B. The important pattern in the latency 
per move data is the significant interaction, clearly 
illustrated in Figure 2, however in 1A, the mean latency 
per move was similar in both interactivity conditions 
during the first attempt, and as a result, the drop in move 
selection latency in the high interactivity condition 
during the second attempt produced an overall order 
main effect (namely, the order Low 1
st
 - High 2
nd 
lead to 





).   
The second presentation of the problem offered the 
opportunity to gauge the degree of learning and transfer 
from one interactivity context to another. There was 
much evidence of learning, when the second opportunity 
to solve the problem took place in a context that 
favoured a high level of interactivity: Participants 
completed the problem in less time and selected moves 
at a faster rate than when the second presentation of the 
problem was in the low interactivity condition. In fact, 
when the low interactivity condition was experienced 
second, performance reflected little learning and transfer. 
This pattern of results suggests two competing 
explanations: (i) the process and quality of knowledge 
acquisition is different as a function of the level of 
interactivity or (ii) interactivity is a performance 
facilitator and a high level of interactivity more clearly 
showcases learning. We evaluate each explanation in 
turn. 
First exposure to the problem without much 
interactivity might have fostered the acquisition of a 
sounder and more actionable representation of the task 
and appreciation of an efficient sequence of moves to 
solution. In contrast, experiencing the problem in a 
context that fosters a high level of interactivity might not 
be accompanied by the same investment in cognitive 
effort, proceeding primarily on the basis of procedural 
learning, which in turn might interfere with the 
development of an accessible and transferable 
conceptual representation of the problem. As a result, 
when the problem is encountered for the second time in a 
condition without much interactivity, the procedural 
knowledge does not facilitate transfer; however, when 
the second presentation occurs in the high interactivity 
condition, performance substantially benefits from the 
knowledge acquired on the basis of the experience in the 
low interactivity condition. The pattern of results from 
Experiment 1A and 1B offers some support for this 
conjecture. 
Alternatively, the substantial improvement in the 
high interactivity condition when participants are 
presented the problem a second time might not reflect 
differences in the type and quality of learning but rather 
release from a performance bottleneck. In other words, 
interactivity is a performance facilitator. Cognitive 
efforts and task demands are more exacting with low 
interactivity—as evidenced by the significantly longer 
latency per move. When participants encounter the 
problem a second time but this time can benefit from 
cheaper move selection by moving artefacts on the 
board, they experience a release from the cognitive 
demands of the low interactivity condition and are 
quicker at producing moves, and hence quicker to reach 
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a solution. The river crossing problem is narrow analytic 
problem with a tightly defined problem space: 
participants can’t wander off-piste very far. Faster move 
selection and the production of more moves leads to the 
goal state quicker. 
The design of Experiment 1A and the replication 1B, 
however, cannot provide data to adjudicate the relative 
merits of these conjectures since attempt and 
interactivity level were not decoupled. Experiment 2 was 
designed to disentangle the effects of order and 
interactivity on learning by manipulating the levels of 
interactivity between subjects. Thus, as in Experiment 
1A and 1B, participants completed the river crossing 
problem twice, however, unlike in those two 
experiments, they did so either in a low or a high 
interactivity context both times. In this manner, 
Experiment 2 could provide data to determine the 
magnitude of learning as reflected in improvement in 
performance across the two presentations. In light of 
O’Hara and Payne’s (1998) conjecture that planning 
impacts performance for different levels of interactivity, 
Experiment 2 also sought to measure independently 
participants’ planning abilities by having them complete 
a series of Tower of London problems during the 
experimental session. The Tower of London (ToL) is a 
transformation problem used to assess planning skills in 
healthy and neuropsychological patients (Shallice, 1982; 
Ward & Allport, 1997; Unterrainer, Rahm, Leonhart, 
Ruff, & Halsband, 2003). We sought to determine the 
degree to which planning performance with a series of 
three-disk ToL problems could predict river crossing 
performance. Specifically, we predicted that planning 
skills would correlate with river crossing performance in 
the low interactivity condition; however, in a high 
interactivity context, the ease of selecting and 
implementing moves, should level off individual 




Eighty-nine university undergraduates participated 
in exchange for course credits. Thirteen participants did 
not complete the river crossing problem within the 
allocated time and were subsequently excluded from 
further analysis. Following tests for skewness in the 
latency data a further 6 participants were removed from 
the analysis to ensure the data were normally 
distributed. The final sample was composed of 70 
participants (58 females, Mage = 22.9, SD = 5.5). 
Materials and Procedure 
The same procedure designed for Experiment 1A and 
1B was employed in Experiment 2 save for two changes. 
First, participants were randomly allocated to either the 
low or high interactivity group, and therefore completed 
the river crossing in the same interactivity condition 
twice. Second, participants completed a series of Tower 
of London (ToL) problems during the experimental 
session: half of the participants completed the ToL 
before the first attempt at completing the task (or the first 
attempt) the other half after the second attempt. The ToL 
task was adapted from Shallice’s (1982) version by using 
paper pegs printed on an A4 card and coloured paper 
disks that could be moved about on the card. The rules 
were printed on an A4 sheet of white paper and read: (i) 
move only one disk at a time; (ii) move only the top 
disk; (iii) no more than two disks on the middle peg and 
no more than one disk on the shortest peg. The disks and 
pegs were placed in front of the participant in the initial 
state. The nature of the task was explained to the 
participant. It was also explained that the researcher 
would note the time taken and number of moves 
completed for each of the four problems. They were not 
given the opportunity to practice; no instructions were 
given on planning or time allowed for completion of the 
problems. Participants were then asked to read the rules 
before beginning the task, and to state that they 
understood the rules and the goal of the task. The rules 
were then removed from sight. Participants were shown 
four different goal-state configurations of the three disks 
on three pegs of different heights in an identical format 
to the card. At the start of each problem, the disks were 
set at the same initial state, participants were shown a 
new goal-state configuration and were then required to 
rearrange the disks one by one to match the goal state. 




The latency data were skewed in three of the four 
experimental conditions. Removing the six slowest 
participants ensured that indices of skewness were 
within the acceptable range (Z in all conditions < 1.96). 
The mean latencies to completion in both groups for 
both attempts are reported in Table 1. Latency to 
completion declined considerably from the first to the 
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second attempt in both interactivity groups. In a 2x2 
mixed ANOVA the main effect of attempt was 
significant F(1, 68) = 63.7, p < .001, p
2 
= .483; 
however, the main effect of group was not , F < 1, nor 
was the attempt by group interaction, F < 1. 
Moves 
Participants in the high interactivity group produced 
a greater number of legal moves than those in the low 
interactivity group during the first and second attempt, 
but participants in both groups selected fewer moves 
during the second attempt (see Table 1). The mean 
number of illegal moves was also greater in the high 
interactivity group than in the low interactivity group 
(see Table 1); however, both groups selected fewer 
illegal moves during their second attempt. A similar 
pattern was produced with the overall number of 
moves: More overall moves were made in the high 
interactivity group than in the low interactivity group, 
but fewer moves were made in the second attempt and 
this in both groups. In a 2x2 mixed ANOVA on total 
moves the main effect of attempt was significant F(1, 
68) = 11.0, p = .001, p
2 
= .139, the main effect of 
group was significant F(1, 68) = 21.3, p < .001, p
2 
= 
.238, but the attempt by group interaction was not, F < 
1. 
Latency per Move 
The latency per move data are illustrated in the right 
panel of Figure 2. There are two patterns of note. First, 
latency per move decreased during the second attempt in 
both groups; second, high interactivity participants were 
faster at selecting moves than the low interactivity 
participants during both attempts. In a 2x2 mixed 
ANOVA the main effect of attempt was significant, F(1, 
68) = 77.9, p < .001, p
2 
=. 534, as was the main effect of 
group F(1, 68) = 12.6, p =.001, p
2 
=. 157; the group by 




Planning Skills as Predictor of Performance 
The mean latency to complete each of the four ToL 
problems was 26.9s (SD = 13.5) for participants in the 
low interactivity group, and 31s (SD = 18.9) for those in 
the high interactivity group; the difference between 
groups was not significant, t(68) = -1.04, p = .302. The 
mean number of moves for each ToL problem in the low 
interactivity group was 8.67 (SD = 2.63) and 9.94 (SD = 
3.71) in the high interactivity group: the difference was 
not significant, t(68) = -1.64, p = .105. Thus, planning 
skills as determined by this measure did not differ 
between the two groups of participants. However, ToL 
latencies moderately correlated with the latencies for the 
first, r(31) = .344, p = .05, and strongly with the second 
attempt, r(31) = .524, p = .002, in the low interactivity 
condition. Thus, the faster participants were at 
completing the ToL problems, the faster they were at 
completing the river crossing problems for both attempts 
in the low interactivity group. In contrast, participants’ 
ToL latencies did not predict the time to complete the 
river crossing problem in the high interactivity group, 
either for the first, r(35) = .071, p = .675, or the second 
attempt, r(35) = -.151, p = .372.  
Discussion 
Experiment 2 was designed to offer additional data 
to adjudicate the conjectures formulated in explaining 
performance during the second presentation of the task 
in Experiment 1A and 1B. In those experiments, latency 
and latency per move were substantially lower, 
suggesting significant learning, when the high 
interactivity but not the low interactivity condition was 
experienced second. Since interactivity was 
manipulated within subjects in these experiments, the 
nature of the learning experience during the first 
crossing was not controlled across the two presentations 
of the problem. A couple of conjectures were offered 
that could only be tested with an experiment where the 
interactivity level was manipulated between subjects, 
hence controlling for interactivity level across the two 
presentations. 
The data from Experiment 2 painted a relatively 
unambiguous picture: Learning was evident in both the 
low and high interactivity conditions. Thus, the 
substantial learning in terms of reduced latency and 
latency per move in the low interactivity condition in 
this experiment lends some support to the notion that, in 
Experiment 1A and 1B, experience in a high 
interactivity condition first may have retarded transfer 
when the second attempt took place in low interactivity 
context. In addition, this performance improvement 
cannot be attributed to a performance bottleneck caused 
by the relative cost of move selection in the low 
interactivity condition. In Experiment 2 participants 
who completed the first crossing in the low interactivity 
condition were significantly faster completing the 
second crossing in the same condition. 
However, latency per move was faster in the high 
interactivity condition than in the low interactivity 
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condition for both attempts at solving the problem. The 
absence of a significant interaction between 
interactivity and attempt in these data indicates that the 
performance improvement was similar in both 
interactivity conditions. Indeed, the average decrease in 
latency per move from the first to the second attempt at 
completing the problem was 7.86s (SD = 6.78) in the 
low interactivity group, and 5.62s (SD = 6.06) in the 
high interactivity group, a non significant difference, 
t(68) = 1.47, p = .147. 
We conjectured that learning in the high 
interactivity condition of Experiment 1A and 1B when 
experienced during the second presentation of the 
problem reflected a sounder appreciation of the task 
obtained through a more sustained planning effort 
during the first presentation with low interactivity. This 
hypothesis is not supported by the data obtained in the 
present experiment. Researchers such as O’Hara and 
Payne (1998; see also Svendsen, 1991) have argued that 
a low interactivity environment—in which it is 
relatively more costly in terms of efforts to produce a 
move— encourages people to plan more before 
selecting a move which results in a richer and more 
transferable problem representation. However, in the 
experiment reported here, participants who completed 
the problem in the high interactivity condition did so 
significantly quicker during the second presentation. 
Admittedly, a lower cost structure, where moves are 
cheap, encourages more moves; indeed participants in 
the high interactivity group always selected more 
moves than participants in the low interactivity group. 
However, latency per move was significantly faster in 
the second presentation, and indeed significantly faster 
than the latency per move for participants in the low 
interactivity group. Thus, the argument that learning is 
mitigated by the low cost structure is not supported by 
the latency per move data reported here. 
Finally, participants in both groups did not differ in 
their planning abilities as reflected by the similar 
average latency to complete each of the four ToL 
problems. Of greater interest was the fact that ToL 
latencies were strongly positively correlated with 
latencies to complete the river crossing task, and this for 
both attempts, in the low interactivity group. In 
contrast, the river crossing latencies did not predict 
participants’ performance on the ToL problems in the 
high interactivity group. To be sure, this pattern of 
correlational evidence indicates that higher interactivity 
may reduce the contribution of forward planning in the 
selection of moves. Perhaps more important, it suggests 
that high levels of interactivity may elevate the 
performance of participants with poor planning 
abilities, such that their performance is comparable to 
participants with higher planning abilities.  
General Discussion 
Outside the psychologist’s laboratory, scientists and 
lay people alike naturally create and build artefacts or 
recruit existing ones to configure highly interactive 
contexts of reasoning and facilitate problem solving. 
Thus, solving jigsaw puzzles involves physically 
juxtaposing different pieces to gauge their fit; in 
Scrabble, letter tiles are physically re-arranged to 
facilitate word production; in Tetris, tetrominoes are 
physically rotated to determine their optimal slot. And 
beyond puzzles and games, experts structure an external 
environment to support thinking. Scientists use physical 
objects and their arrangement in space to formulate and 
test hypotheses: Watson (1968, pp. 152-155) describes 
how he cleared his desk, cut out shapes corresponding 
to the four nucleobases, and manipulated them until he 
saw which ones could be paired to hold the double helix 
together (see Vallée-Tourangeau, under review). 
The key driver of thinking in these examples is 
interactivity, how features of the world that configure a 
certain problem are arranged and re-arranged 
dynamically over time to evince a certain solution, to 
produce a desirable goal state. The work reported here 
shares a number of theoretical commitments with the 
seminal characterization of the role of external 
representations in problem solving outlined in Zhang 
and Norman (1994) as well as the elegant experiments 
and modelling efforts on soft constraints that determine 
when the world or internal memory is consulted in a 
wide range of tasks (e.g., Fu, 2011; Gray, Sims, Fu, & 
Schoelles, 2006). And while Zhang and Norman 
demonstrate how problem-solving performance is 
facilitated when certain rules and dimensions are 
externally represented, they say little about interactivity 
as such, although it is at the heart of their participants’ 
performance. In turn, the interactive behavior described 
in the resource allocation experiments and models 
supporting the soft constraints hypothesis is one that 
reflects the quick iterative sampling of information 
from either an internal source—memory—and the 
world (Gray et al., 2006; Gray & Fu, 2004). These 
researchers do not address the role of interactivity in 
modifying the physical arrangements of a problem, and 
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the contingent spatio-temporal itinerary that maps the 
problem’s solution.  
In the case of the river crossing problem, 
interactivity as designed in the high interactivity 
condition, does not change the nature of the problem or 
reconfigure it in a more cognitively congenial manner 
(unlike, for example, in Tetris or Scrabble, see Maglio, 
Matlock, Raphaely, Chernicky, & Kirsh, 1999). What 
interactivity does is promote a more fluid way to 
explore the problem space, involving as it were limited 
cognitive resources to enact changes. The state of the 
world—as modeled by the artefacts—cues the next 
move. What’s particularly interesting then is the tight 
coupling between the agent and the world. The raft, 
animal figurines, and river board are better thought as 
configuring a world that is a representative of the ‘real’ 
world, not a representation of it (see Noë, 2012): 
participants in the high interactivity condition directly 
manipulate the world not unlike how scientists 
manipulate three dimensional models (such as 
molecules; see Toon, 2011; Watson, above). This 
coupling may be maintained by perception-action loops 
that may not be mediated by complex representations. 
In addition, this level of interactivity may be 
accompanied by a greater degree of task engagement. 
Svendsen (1991) reports that participants who 
experienced a greater degree of interactivity in a low 
implementation cost condition of the Tower of Hanoi 
enjoyed the task more, were more likely to recommend 
the interface, and believed it was quicker to use and 
solve the problem. The problem space that described 
the river crossing problem employed in the low and 
high interactivity condition was the same, clearly. 
However, from an ecological perspective, the problems 
were different in the two conditions. The two 
presentations afforded a different behavioural 
repertoire, supported by different perceptual and 
cognitive processes. Thus, the cognitive ecosystem (cf. 
Hutchins, 2010) implemented in the low and high 
interactivity condition was different, and important 
questions about learning and transfer can and should be 
raised in these different ecosystems.  
Previous work on the river crossing problem 
demonstrated learning across repeated presentation of 
the same problem; however evidence of learning 
transfer across analogous problems is more equivocal 
(Reed et al., 1974). Knowles and Delaney (2005), using 
computer generated images, also investigated learning 
in the river crossing problem by attempting to improve 
performance through the reduction of illegal moves. 
However, what was being learnt was not made clear 
beyond offering the conjecture that learning reflected 
“enhanced rule verification skills” (p.679). But these 
additional skills were not independently assessed and 
measured, and the conjecture does not offer much 
beyond a re-description of the data. Unlike Knowles 
and Delaney, the focus of the experiments reported here 
was not on improving performance in the number of 
moves made with a cost manipulation; rather it was to 
investigate how different levels of interactivity using 
artefacts, not computer generated images, influenced 
problem solving performance and learning.  
The experiments presented here indicate that 
learning proceeds in both interactivity contexts. In 
addition, Experiment 1A and Experiment 1B offered a 
potentially interesting window on the nature of the 
transfer from low to high interactivity: Participants 
performed the task fastest in a high interactivity context 
when they had first experienced it in a low interactivity 
context. Over repeated presentations of the same 
problem, we would expect performance to improve, as 
it did. However, a change in problem solving mode may 
mitigate the learning effect in that participants must 
learn a new way to play the game as it were. The data 
reported here suggest that it is easier to adapt when the 
change is from a low to a high interactivity condition, 
rather than the reverse. The embodied immediacy of the 
contact with the problem, unmediated by symbolic 
representations, favours a quicker selection of moves, 
which results in a quicker solution of the problem. The 
transfer from a high interactivity to a low interactivity 
condition results in a slower adaptation to the change in 
the task ecology because move selection is mediated 
through an indirect symbolic representation of the task. 
The results of the second experiment make clear that 
both interactivity conditions promote learning, although 
participants remain quicker in the high interactivity 
condition. However, adapting to a new task 
environment is more challenging when participants 
move from a high to a low interactivity condition. 
Problem solving performance is more efficient if 
participants experience its abstract version first and then 
subsequently engage with it with a greater degree of 
interactivity.  
The transfer asymmetry observed in Experiments 
1A and 1B has interesting implications for an 
understanding of problem isomorphs especially as 
teaching and learning tools. Knowledge acquired 
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through traditional abstract teaching methods followed 
by an interactive experience using manipulable artefacts 
may result in improved transfer and learning beyond the 
expected learning of repeated problem presentations. 
Lave (1988) in her ethnographic research investigated 
the transfer of knowledge learnt at school as it is 
applied to everyday life, revealing the different 
heuristics ‘just plain folk’ (p. 43) employed in solving 
math problems in practical situations, such as shopping 
in the supermarket. Lave questions the common view 
that arithmetic as learned in school, is ‘carried away’ 
from this supposedly ‘context-free’ learning 
environment as a transportable tool for direct 
application to practical situations requiring math skills. 
She suggested that rather than conceptualizing the 
individual as a ‘self-contained, disembodied technology 
of cognition’ it is more appropriate to analyse ‘the 
whole person in action, acting with the settings of that 
activity’ and interacting with the lived in world (p.17). 
Lave was concerned with the transfer of knowledge 
from abstract traditional teachings in school to more 
practical use in everyday life. The experiments reported 
here may lay a foundation to address these concerns 
with empirical evidence indicating that learning an 
abstract concept followed by consolidation with 
concrete three dimensional recognizable artefacts 
embodied with the same rules and constraints of the 
original concept significantly enhances learning. 
O’Hara and Payne (1998) discussed the planning-
acting continuum in analytic problem solving, and 
investigated the task, environment, operator, and agent 
contingencies that influence the amount of planning. 
Clearly, a high degree of interactivity may encourage 
quicker and more fluid action that shapes and reshapes 
the problem presentation without much prior planning. 
A lower degree of interactivity may force reasoners to 
think more carefully in the process of identifying the 
best move in a sequence. While a higher level of 
interactivity enhanced the performance of an individual 
in terms of how quickly moves were made, when 
measuring the number of moves taken to complete the 
problem, low interactivity encouraged better 
performance. Therefore, determining which level of 
interactivity better promotes learning can only be 
answered relative to considerations of efficiency 
themselves relative to a particular context of reasoning. 
In other words, the cost structure for a particular task is 
relative to a set of situated parameters: sometimes it is 
useful to think long and hard (e.g., carefully planning a 
move in chess) and sometimes it is best to act quickly 
(e.g., moving a zoid in Tetris). The efficiency metric is 
dependent on the situation: If it is costly to make 
moves, then it is important to invest time into the 
contemplation of each move to be made; if the number 
of moves made is unimportant, but time is of the 
essence, then acting quickly is the efficient use of 
available resources. Still, there remains an important 
challenge for research on interactivity: Namely, to 
determine the nature of the learning and the knowledge 
representation evinced by different levels and modes of 
interactivity.  
In the experiments presented here, the problem does 
not change between problem presentations; however, 
interactivity in the physical world alters the cognitive 
landscape. In addition the amount of transfer and 
learning were seen to be contingent on the sequence 
with which the problem presentation was experienced. 
These results suggest that outcomes for learning and 
problem solving may differ when using the body and 
the concrete world to explore the problem space. 
Education is rapidly advancing toward the use of 
computer centered learning; coupling bodies to a 
dynamic and modifiable world during learning, problem 
solving and decision making poses important 
pedagogical questions (Kirsh, 1997; Klahr, Triona, & 
Williams, 2007; Moreno & Mayer, 2007; Renken & 
Nunez, 2013). Interactivity is now often couched in 
terms of interaction with a computer interface, 
knowledge and skills learnt from that mode of 
interactivity need to be assessed against interaction with 
the lived in physical world. Future research on this front 
would likely yield findings with important pedagogical 
implications as well as offering guidance to researchers 
working on the innovation and learnability of 
scaffolding interfaces (cf. Bolland, 2011). 
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